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School Desegregation and White Flight:
The Unconstitutionality of Integration
Maintenance Plans
Three decades have passed since the Supreme Court first held
that segregation on the basis of race in the public schools is unlaw-
ful.' During this time, courts and school boards have struggled to
develop effective school desegregation plans. One of the problems
they have encountered is the phenomenon of "white flight." The
term "white flight" describes the decline in white enrollment in
public school systems.'
Social science research suggests that some of the decline in
white enrollment in public school systems undergoing court-or-
dered desegregation may be caused by desegregation itself, or,
more accurately, by parental concerns about the process.3 Specific
parental concerns include opposition to busing, fear that increasing
the number of black students in local schools will lead to residen-
tial integration, concern about a decline in educational quality, and
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) ("Brown II").
2 In the context of school desegregation, the term "white flight" encompasses two types
of behavior: first, the movement of white students from public to private schools; and sec-
ond, the movement of white families out of a school district altogether. See Christine H.
Rossell, Applied Social Science Research: What Does It Say About the Effectiveness of
School Desegregation Plans?, 12 J. Legal Stud. 69, 81 (1983). Causation of white flight is a
complex and hotly debated issue. While most researchers agree that school desegregation
does contribute to white flight, there is wide disagreement on the extent of its impact and
on how to minimize its effects. The following is a representative sampling of the literature:
Gary Orfield, White Flight Research: Its Importance, Perplexities and Possible Policy Impli-
cations, in Gary Orfield, ed., Symposium on School Desegregation and White Flight 43
(1975); James S. Coleman, Sara D. Kelly, and John A. Moore, Trends in School Segregation,
1968-73 (1975) (school desegregation has significant causative impact on white flight);
Thomas F. Pettigrew and Robert L. Green, School Desegregation in Large Cities: A Critique
of the Coleman "White Flight" Thesis, 46 Harv. Educ. Rev. 1 (1976); Diane Ravitch, The
"White Flight" Controversy, 51 Pub. Interest 135, 145 (Spring 1978) (it is "impossible to
contend" that court-ordered school desegregation does not accelerate white flight); Reynolds
Farley, School Integration and White Flight, in Gary Orfield, ed., Symposium on School
Desegregation and White Flight 11 (1975) (when public schools are desegregated or when
they become predominantly black, some white parents hasten their move away from the
central city); Christine H. Rossell, School Desegregation and White Flight, 90 Pol. Sci. Q.
675 (1975-76).
3 See, for example, Coleman, Trends in School Segregation (cited in note 2); Orfield,
Symposium on School Desegregation and White Flight 43 (cited in note 2).
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simple aversion to integrated education.4 Some studies indicate
that decreases in white enrollment correlate positively with the in-
crease in black enrollment that accompanies desegregation. 5 Based
on these findings, some school boards have instituted plans that
limit black enrollment in racially mixed schools in an effort to keep
white children in those schools ("integration maintenance plans").6
Integration maintenance plans differ from more typical school de-
segregation plans in that they implement racial quotas that are
based on perceived white preferences rather than on some more
neutral measure, such as the ratio of black to white students in the
school district as a whole.7
This comment considers the constitutionality of integration
maintenance plans.' Part I discusses the Supreme Court's treat-
See Christine H. Rossell, School Desegregation and Community Social Change, 42 L.
and Contemp. Probs. 133 (Summer, 1978).
5 See, for example, Charles Clotfelter, The Implications of "Resegregation" for Judi-
cially Imposed School Segregation Remedies, 31 Vand. L. Rev. 829 (1978); Rossell, 12 J.
Legal Stud. at 106 (cited in note 2). This comment addresses limitations on black enroll-
ment rather than overall minority enrollment because most desegregation plans are couched
in those terms. References to blacks, however, should be seen as a short form for "blacks
and other minorities," as the analysis remains the same.
6 See, for example, Clark v. Board of Educ. of Little Rock School Dist., 705 F.2d 265,
271 (8th Cir. 1983); Johnson v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 604 F.2d 504, 516-17 (7th
Cir. 1979); Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 719-20
(2d Cir. 1979) ("Andrew Jackson"); United States v. School District of Omaha, 521 F.2d
530, 547 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 554 F. Supp.
912, 919-20 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
7 Compare Morgan v. Kerrigan, 510 F.2d 401, 423 (1st Cir. 1976), where the court of
appeals approved racial quotas which approximated racial balance in the community, with
Andrew Jackson, 598 F.2d at 720, approving a ceiling on black enrollment of 50 percent in a
system that was over 50 percent black. See also Johnson, 604 F.2d at 509-10, 516-17, approv-
ing quotas set at a level that approximated the racial balance in the population at the time
the plan was implemented, and frozen at that level despite an increasing black population.
8 The issues raised in the school desegregation context are very similar to those raised
in the housing context. See, for example, Rodney A. Smolla, Integration Maintenance: The
Unconstitutionality of Benign Programs that Discourage Black Entry to Prevent White
Flight, 1981 Duke L.J. 891; Bruce L. Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the
Question of Racial Occupancy Controls, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 245 (1974); Victor S. Navasky, The
Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 How. L.J. 30 (1960); Note, Benign Steering and Benign Quo-
tas: The Validity of Race-Conscious Government Policies to Promote Residential Integra-
tion, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 938 (1980).
The main difference between the two sets of issues is that the immediate deprivation
inflicted by imposition of racial ceilings in public housing projects is far more severe than
that inflicted when a child cannot attend the school of his or her choice. Compare Burney v.
Housing Authority of County of Beaver, 551 F. Supp. 746, 764 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (denial of
housing and implication of inferiority raised by government restricted minority access ren-
dered unconstitutional a consent decree establishing a target racial balance in housing
projects) with Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122, 1137 (2d Cir.
1973) (housing authority permitted to deny housing to minority group members in order to
prevent "tipping"). See also United States v. Starrett City Associates, No. 84 CV 2793
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ment of the threshold question whether white flight may ever be
considered when designing desegregation plans. Part II develops a
framework for analysis of integration maintenance plans under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment9 and sug-
gests two reasons for the general disapproval of government ac-
tions that classify people according to race. Finally, Part III exam-
ines the constitutionality of integration maintenance plans within
this framework, and concludes that such plans violate the Equal
Protection Clause.
I. IS WHITE FLIGHT EVER A PERMISSIBLE CONSIDERATION IN THE
CONSTRUCTION OF A DESEGREGATION PLAN?
Courts are divided over whether, and in what manner, school
boards may take white flight into account when crafting desegrega-
tion plans.10 This division has been fueled by language in two Su-
preme Court opinions suggesting that white flight, or the possibil-
ity that it might occur, is not a permissible consideration. Closer
examination of the Court's treatment of the issue suggests that
there are circumstances in which white flight may be considered in
creating a desegregation plan. The Court's framework, however, is
inadequate as a means of evaluating specific ways of limiting white
flight. In particular, it is inadequate as a means of evaluating inte-
gration maintenance plans.
In United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education,"
the Supreme Court held that the school board's fear of white flight
could not justify its attempt to escape court-ordered desegregation
of a previously segregated school system. The case involved the
Halifax County, North Carolina school district, which had been
(E.D.N.Y. May 15, 1987) (available on LEXIS) (ceilings on minority access to a private
housing development violate the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S. § 3604 (1983), even though insti-
tuted to prevent segregation).
1 U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
10 See, for example, Clark, 705 F.2d at 271 (white flight may be taken into account in
an attempt to promote integration); Riddick v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521,
540 (4th Cir. 1986) (white flight can be considered in devising a voluntary plan to improve
the racial balance of the schools); Stout v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 537 F.2d 800, 802-
03 (5th Cir. 1976) (in choosing between various permissible plans, court may choose the one
minimizing white flight). Compare United States v. Pittman, 808 F.2d 385, 390-91 (5th Cir.
1987) (plan that placed a ceiling on black enrollment in certain schools, leaving two of
eleven schools in the system all-black, was "fatally flawed"); Morgan, 530 F.2d at 422
("resegregation" caused by white flight is not constitutionally recognized segregation); Mapp
v. Board of Educ. of City of Chattanooga, 525 F.2d 169, 177 (6th Cir. 1975) (no affirmative
obligation to address white flight), aff'g 366 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
"1 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
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held liable for maintaining a segregated system. Before a desegre-
gation decree could be implemented, the state legislature enacted a
bill that created a new school district bounded by the limits of
Scotland Neck, a city that previously had been part of the Halifax
County school district. The effect of the statute was to carve out of
the Halifax County system an independent, all white, school dis-
trict, which would escape any desegregation plan imposed on the
county system.12
The district court enjoined enforcement of the statute, but
was reversed by the court of appeals."3 The Supreme Court re-
versed, noting that enforcement of the statute would leave the
county system, exclusive of Scotland Neck, 91 percent black. 4 The
Scotland Neck school board argued that separation of the Scotland
Neck schools from the other Halifax County schools was necessary
to avoid white flight by Scotland Neck residents: if forced to par-
ticipate in the desegregation plan, they would leave the system al-
together. The Court rejected the school board's argument, stating
that while white flight "may be cause for deep concern," it cannot
"be accepted as the reason for achieving anything less than com-
plete uprooting of the dual public school system."' 5
Similarly, in Monroe v. Board of Commissioners of the City of
Jackson,6 the Court held inadequate a "free transfer" plan17 that
the school board had implemented in response to a court order to
desegregate its system.'" The school board justified its plan by
claiming that whites would leave if it implemented a plan that in-
volved mandatory reassignment of students on the basis of race.'
The Court held that fears of white flight could not justify a plan
that was otherwise inadequate, noting that " 'the vitality of these
constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because
of disagreement with them.' ?120
In both Scotland Neck and Monroe, the school board offered
the possibility of white flight-as a justification for avoiding consti-
tutionally compelled desegregation. In Wright v. Council of City of
12 Id. at 485-87.
IS Id. at 488.
14 Id. at 490.
16 Id. at 491.
16 391 U.S. 450 (1968).
17 A free transfer plan is one which does not involve mandatory reassignment of stu-
dents according to race. Instead, students are given the option of transferring out of their
neighborhood schools into schools where children of their race are in a minority.
18 391 U.S. at 459.
19 Id.
20 391 U.S. at 459, quoting Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300.
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Emporia,21 the Court faced a different issue. In Wright, the city of
Emporia, Virginia, attempted to withdraw from the surrounding
county, which had been ordered to desegregate its school system.22
The district court concluded that if Emporia were allowed to with-
draw from the county, white flight would result. The proportion of
white students in the county system would drop, thus precipitating
a further drain of whites from the system and frustrating the de-
segregation process. On this basis, the district court enjoined Em-
poria from withdrawing.2 3 The court of appeals reversed the dis-
trict court ruling.24 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the
court of appeals, finding that Emporia's withdrawal would cause
white flight and thereby impede desegregation." Implicit in the
Court's holding was that the possibility of white flight was an ap-
propriate concern in these circumstances.
Although the Court in Wright did not distinguish Scotland
Neck and Monroe, the distinction is readily drawn. Fear of white
flight may form the basis for remedies on behalf of school desegre-
gation, but such fear may not form the basis for a retreat from
desegregation.26 In Wright, the district court responded to the pos-
sibility of white flight with a vigorous effort to promote desegrega-
21 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
22 Id. at 456.
22 Id. at 463.
24 Id. at 460-61.
25 Id. at 469-71.
26 Most lower courts have adopted a case-by-case approach, attempting to adhere to the
Supreme Court's distinction. See, for example, Clark, 705 F.2d at 271 (white flight may be
taken into account in an attempt to promote integration); Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish
School Board, 721 F.2d 1425, 1438 (5th Cir. 1983) (efforts to desegregate could not be termi-
nated because of fears that desegregation would cause white flight, but school board had a
duty to try to stem white flight through other means); compare United States v. DeSoto
Parish School Board, 574 F.2d 804, 815-16 (5th Cir. 1978) (cannot limit desegregation in
order to prevent white flight).
A few courts have taken the position that resegregation caused by white flight is irrele-
vant to the creation of a remedy for "de jure," or state-enforced, segregation, and that
therefore courts are precluded from ordering school boards to address white flight when
designing desegregation decrees. See, for example, Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d at 422 (lst
Cir. 1976) (" 'resegregation' is not constitutionally recognized segregation," because it is the
result of individual rather than state action); Mapp v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chattanooga,
366 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (school board's interest in a stable racial mix not
relevant because achieving such a mix is not the constitutional mandate), aft'd, 525 F.2d 169
(6th Cir. 1975); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1976)
(where there was no proof that white flight was caused by segregative acts of the board or by
the initial desegregation decree, the district court could not require the school board to
annually adjust attendance patterns in order to maintain a particular racial mix). Compare
Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L.J. 585, 640-641 (1983) (white flight is
actually the result of the original constitutional violation and is therefore legally relevant).
394 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
tion, whereas in Scotland Neck and in Monroe, the school boards
raised the possibility of white flight in an effort to justify complete
acquiescence to community preferences for segregation and virtual
abdication of the duty to desegregate.
The distinction between plans that attempt to prevent white
flight by avoiding desegregation and those that do so in ways that
promote desegregation is an appealing one, and explains cases such
as Scotland Neck, Monroe and Wright quite well. However, it does
not provide an adequate means of determining the constitutional-
ity of integration maintenance plans, which fall between the ex-
tremes. Although integration maintenance plans are not as clearly
an abdication of the duty to desegregate as those implemented in
Scotland Neck and Monroe, neither are they unambiguously bene-
ficial. On one hand, integration maintenance plans do guarantee
some minimal level of black representation in the schools; on the
other hand, that level of representation is limited by white prefer-
ences for segregation. Application of the Court's distinction there-
fore requires further definition of those actions that constitute
"promotion," and those that constitute "obstruction," of desegre-
gation. The unique problems presented by integration mainte-
nance plans call for the development of an alternative framework
to give substance to this semantic distinction.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the constitutional ad-
equacy of a desegregation plan is measured by its effectiveness in
achieving desegregation.27 Thus, when white flight limits the effec-
tiveness of a desegregation plan, it must be considered in crafting a
remedy. The difficult problem, however, is devising a way in which
a court or school board can respond to demographic changes in a
manner which is effective, consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause, and does not reward community preferences for
discrimination.
II. THE FRAMEWORK: THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no state "[shall] deny any person the equal protec-
tion of the laws. '28 This language has been characterized as
27 Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971). This principle was emphasized
in Green v. County School Board, where the Court stated "[tlhe burden on a school board
today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realis-
tically to work now." 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (emphasis in original).
28 U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
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prohibiting all race-conscious government action.29 School desegre-
gation plans are necessarily race-conscious; yet, they have been up-
held as constitutional. Thus, analysis of the constitutionality of in-
tegration maintenance plans cannot turn on their race-conscious
nature alone. Rather, such plans must be examined to see whether
they raise particular concerns under the Equal Protection Clause,
concerns that are not raised by typical desegregation plans. To de-
termine whether integration maintenance plans raise such equal
protection concerns, one must first identify the evils against which
the clause protects. Examination of integration maintenance plans
in this light reveals that they implicate fundamental equal protec-
tion concerns, concerns that parallel those raised by de jure segre-
gation but are distinct from those raised by other race-conscious
remedies for segregation. Thus, under all but a few, narrowly de-
fined circumstances, they should be deemed unconstitutional.
A. Process and Impact Theories of Equal Protection
Two approaches dominate explanations of the evils against
which the Equal Protection Clause seeks to guard: the process-ori-
ented approach and the impact-oriented approach. The process-
oriented approach suggests that the clause is aimed at preventing
certain defects in governmental decision-making processes. The
impact-oriented approach suggests that it is aimed at preventing
certain kinds of harm from being inflicted on people solely because
of their race. Integration maintenance plans, as distinct from other
race-conscious remedies, are particularly problematic because they
give rise to both types of concerns.
1. The Process-Oriented Approach. The process-oriented ap-
proach to equal protection analysis maintains that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause prohibits government action that is influenced by
certain factors.3 0 Racial prejudice is one such factor. Any govern-
ment action that selectively disadvantages the members of particu-
lar groups must bear some relation to a legitimate government ob-
jective, meaning an objective that does not stem from racial bias. 1
There are several ways in which racial bias can influence govern-
" But see David A. Strauss, The Myth of Color Blindness, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99, argu-
ing that the Constitution does not mandate color blindness.
30 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum.
L. Rev. 1689 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 127; Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidis-
crimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7-8 (1976).
S See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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ment decisions. First, a government action may be taken in order
to disadvantage a particular group. Second, though a government
action may not rest on a desire to disadvantage as such, it might
rest on assumptions of the inferior worth of certain races. 3 2 Segre-
gation, for example, is theoretically premised not on a desire to
harm blacks, but to separate them from whites, because they are
thought inferior. Third, government action might reflect the fact
that the decision makers are more likely to empathize with the
concerns felt by members of their own race than those of other
races.
33
Where the asserted justification for discriminatory govern-
ment action is rational, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for a
court to inquire into and discover the real motivation behind the
action.34 Instead of pursuing this problematic inquiry, the Supreme
Court has used a three-level standard of review as a proxy for the
inquiry into actual motivation by identifying types of government
actions that present an especially high likelihood of impermissible
motivation.35 Government actions based on racial classifications
are thought especially likely to have been influenced by racial bias.
Even when the disadvantage imposed by such actions is minimal,
decisions based on a legislative preference for discrimination vio-
late the guarantee of equal protection. Thus, courts have deemed
unconstitutional laws that expressly classify people on the basis of
race unless the classification can be shown to be "necessary' 3e to
achieve a "compelling" government interest.37 This standard of re-
12 Brest, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 7-8 (cited in note 30).
3 Id.
31 Id. at 9; Smolla, 1981 Duke L.J. at 926-31 (cited in note 8).
" Note that the Supreme Court has never acknowledged this as the rationale underly-
ing its three-level standard of scrutiny. Rather, those who have analyzed the Court's deci-
sions have concluded that it uses strict scrutiny as a proxy for investigation into government
motivation. See Sunstein, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 131 (cited in note 30) (scrutiny "flushes
out" impermissible ends); Brest, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 15 (cited in note 30) (strict scrutiny
serves as proxy for direct inquiry into the decision-making process).
36 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
'7 The state interest required to support "suspect" classifications, of which race is one,
has been articulated in various ways, all of which imply the same standard of review. See,
for example, In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973) (compelling); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (overriding); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (pressing public necessity). Al-
though racial classifications receive "strict scrutiny" and require a "compelling" state inter-
est, other forms of classification, where the risk of improper legislative motive is deemed less
threatening, receive less exacting scrutiny. Classifications on the basis of gender, for exam-
ple, receive "intermediate" scrutiny requiring only a "substantial" state interest. Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 140 (1976). Other forms of classification, not thought to be particularly
subject to legislative prejudice, receive "rational basis" scrutiny, where the court need only
be able to envision a rational reason for the challenged classification. New York City Transit
[1987:
INTEGRATION MAINTENANCE PLANS
view is referred to as "strict scrutiny." As a practical matter, sub-
jecting any classification to strict scrutiny has resulted in the inval-
idation of that classification. 38
2. The Impact-Oriented Approach. The impact-oriented ap-
proach incorporates the notion that government action cannot be
based on racial prejudice, but focuses on the harmful effects of ra-
cial classifications on minorities.3 In the most obvious sense, such
classifications may disadvantage minorities by denying them jobs,
votes, or public accommodations. These are significant practical
disadvantages, but they represent only one aspect of the harm in-
flicted by racial classifications. The more subtle, but equally invidi-
ous, effect of racial classifications is that they stigmatize and iso-
late minorities, thus compounding any practical disadvantages
imposed.
Thus, there are two strands to the impact-oriented approach.
First, there is a strand that focuses on practical impact, concerning
itself with equality in a material sense, and second, there is a
strand that concerns itself with the stigma inherent in racial think-
ing. In the context of school desegregation, these strands are inter-
woven: to some extent, the practical harms imposed by school seg-
regation flow from its stigmatic impact. The Supreme Court
recognized as much in Brown v. Board of Education, noting that
the quality of education received by black children suffered not
because of inequality of tangible resources,40 but because " 'A
sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.' ,,41
It is this judicial concern with the stigmatic impact of racial
classifications that explains why "separate but equal" is unconsti-
tutional. Riding in the back of the bus instead of the front, or
playing in one park rather than another, imposes no obvious prac-
tical disadvantage. Neither does attending an all-black school.42
But such classifications do stigmatize blacks as being unfit to asso-
ciate with whites, and therefore as inferior. Once stigmatic impact
is recognized as one of the harms the Equal Protection Clause
seeks to prevent, the justification for finding a constitutional viola-
Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
The Supreme Court has only once found the state interest in a racial classification to
be sufficiently compelling. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
39 See Brest, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 6 (cited in note 30).
10 The court made clear that its analysis did not rest on a finding of inequality of re-
sources: "Our decision.., cannot turn on merely a comparison of... tangible factors in the
Negro and white schools involved in each of these cases." 347 U.S. at 492.
347 U.S. at 494, quoting Gebhart v. Belton, 32 Del. Ch. 343, 87 A.2d 862, 865 (1952).
42 See Brest, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 9 (cited in note 30).
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tion is clear. For example, concern with stigmatic harm was clearly
an underlying factor in the Supreme Court's decision in Brown: in
finding "separate but equal" schools unconstitutional the court
emphasized the stigmatic impact of segregation on black children,
stating that it "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that is unlikely ever to be undone. '43
The practical impact approach lies at the heart of the justifi-
cation for integration maintenance plans. The argument is that
some mixing of the races is better than none, since white schools
generally have better facilities and more extensive resources than
black schools. The shortcoming of this approach is that it does not
grapple with the fundamental concern in Brown, the concern
which is one of the motivating factors behind application of the
Equal Protection Clause: the stigmatic impact of racial classifica-
tions. By focusing on stigma as a central concern of the impact-
oriented approach to equal protection analysis, it is possible to dis-
tinguish between race-conscious remedies that further the goals of
equal protection and those that compound the injury it seeks to
avert.
III. INTEGRATION MAINTENANCE PLANS AND
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Integration maintenance plans are problematic under both
theories of equal protection in ways that other race-conscious de-
segregation remedies are not. The distinction between integration
maintenance plans and other desegregation plans that assign stu-
dents on the basis of race is that the former are premised on ac-
commodation of white preferences for discrimination. That is, inte-
gration maintenance plans implement quotas that are based on the
percentage of black students that the school board believes white
families will tolerate, while other desegregation plans implement
quotas based on the racial mixture in some larger segment of the
school district's population. This is a crucial distinction for pur-
poses of determining the constitutionality of integration mainte-
nance plans.
A. Application of Process and Impact-Oriented Approaches
A specific example will clarify application of the process- and
impact-oriented approaches of equal protection analysis." Suppose
4' 347 U.S. at 494; see also Brest, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 9 (cited in note 30).
" This example assumes that all the school board members are white.
[1987:
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a school district has maintained a segregated school system. The
district has two schools, school A, which is all white, and school B,
which is all black. The district-wide student body is 60 percent
black and 40 percent white. As part of a court-ordered desegrega-
tion plan, the school board decides that school A should maintain a
student population that is 70 percent white and 30 percent black.
Because the ratio of black to white students in the system is
greater than the ratio to be maintained at school A, school B will
remain virtually all black. The school board explains that if both
schools are maintained at a ratio that accurately reflects the com-
position of the district-wide population, white families will pull
their children out and, instead of having one black school and one
integrated school, the district will have two virtually all black
schools.
The school board's plan clearly classifies students on the basis
of race. All desegregation plans, however, involve student reassign-
ment on the basis of race. When examined in light of the process
and impact approaches, it is apparent that integration mainte-
nance plans are particularly problematic because they accede to
white preferences for limiting integration.
1. The Process-Oriented Approach and Integration Mainte-
nance Plans. When government action is premised upon the ac-
commodation of white preferences, there is a substantial risk that
the private preferences and biases of the decision makers have
played a role in the decision. For example, a school board choosing
among alternative desegregation plans may choose an integration
maintenance type of plan solely because the board members do not
want their children attending school with blacks, rather than be-
cause they believe such a plan to be the best for the whole commu-
nity. Even if they do not have children in the school, they may
sympathize with white fears about the consequences of school inte-
gration, such as fears about lower real estate values and poorer ed-
ucation.45 Finally, because the board members understand and per-
haps share the fears of white parents, they may undervalue the
disadvantages to blacks of integration maintenance plans, while
overvaluing the benefits of such plans.4" In other words, even if the
board does not intend to disadvantage blacks, its sympathies may
nevertheless introduce racial bias into the decision-making
process.
47
41 See Brest, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 7-8 (cited in note 30).
46 Id.
47 See id. at 19 (with reference to integration maintenance quotas, "an observer cannot
389]
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2. Stigma and Integration Maintenance Plans. Integration
maintenance plans implicate concerns about impact as well as
about process. Because such provisions accommodate white prefer-
ences for segregation, they convey virtually the same message as
governmental endorsement of "separate but equal:" that black stu-
dents are less desirable than white ones.48 The asserted goal of in-
tegration maintenance plans is to promote integration, but only as
much integration as whites will tolerate. Black students are al-
lowed to enter the white school, but only in such numbers that
whites will not be driven away. Such plans not only acknowledge
but institutionalize the limits to white tolerance of integration. In
this sense, integration maintenance plans emphasize and reinforce
the stigma created by de jure segregation.49
3. Palmore v. Sidoti: Accommodating Racial Prejudice. The
Supreme Court has long recognized the special problems attendant
to basing government action on efforts to accommodate white pref-
erences, and, in a recent case, reiterated the significance of those
problems.50 Palmore v. Sidoti involved a child custody battle in
which the child's mother had divorced the child's natural father
and then married a black man. 1 Applying a Florida statute requir-
ing that custody decisions be made in the child's best interest,-the
trial judge awarded custody to the natural father. He did so be-
cause he found that the mother's interracial marriage was not in
the child's best interest. The judge explained that " . . . it [was]
inevitable that [the child would], if allowed to remain [with her
mother],.., suffer from the social stigmatization that [was] sure to
come." 52 The Florida court of appeals affirmed without opinion.
tell whether the decision maker condones the white attitudes or just acknowledges that they
cannot be changed in the short run; whether the policy panders to white prejudice or is
truly designed to promote a stable, integrated environment. Indeed, decision makers may
find it difficult to separate these factors in their own minds.").
" See Morgan, 530 F.2d at 421 (limiting racial mixture amounts to legalizing what had
once been unconstitutional).
4" Some courts have recognized the potential for stigmatization associated with integra-
tion maintenance quotas. See, for example, Clark, 705 F.2d at 269 n.6 ("In a district with a
student body that is 65% black or more, an arbitrary limit of 50% on the black enrollment
in a magnet school could send a message to the black students that they are somehow less
desirable than whites."). This potential has also been recognized in the housing context. See
Burney v. Housing Authority of County of Beaver, 551 F. Supp. at 758. See also Gewirtz, 92
Yale L.J. at 662 (cited in note 26) (remedies that limit racial mixing because of white prefer-
ence may inflict dignitary harms on black children).
50 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963);
Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963).
466 U.S. 429 (1984).
52 Id. at 431.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.5 3 The Court,
while recognizing the reality of racial prejudice, held that such
prejudice could not justify basing the custody decision solely on
the race of the child's stepfather. Writing for a unanimous Court,
Chief Justice Burger stated that "[t]he Constitution cannot control
such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases
may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect. '5 4
Palmore incorporates both the process and impact approaches
to equal protection analysis. Process concerns are evident in the
Court's statement that racial classifications are "more likely to re-
flect racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns, ' 55 and con-
cern over impact is evident in the recognition that even rational
race-dependent decisions can perpetuate or recreate the harm in-
flicted by racial prejudice.
4. Integration Maintenance Plans: Palmore Exacerbated. In-
tegration maintenance plans are even more problematic than the
decision invalidated in Palmore. First, although race affected the
outcome of the trial judge's decision in Palmore, that decision was
arguably neutral in effect.56 The decision hurt the child's white
mother as much, if not more than, it hurt her black stepfather.
The same result would have been reached even if the races of the
participants had been reversed. Integration maintenance plans,
however, exclude blacks, not whites. In no sense are they racially
neutral.
Second, integration maintenance plans involve issues that are
hotly debated within the community. As a result they create
greater incentives, and greater opportunity, for the expression of
racial prejudice than do decisions such as the one overruled in Pal-
more. 5 7 By limiting black enrollment in order to accommodate
white opposition, integration maintenance plans create an incen-
tive for white parents to object to desegregation as vociferously as
possible.
The problem presented by integration maintenance plans is
similar to that presented by the "heckler's veto" in the First
53 Id.
Id. at 433 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 432.
58 For an argument that the trial judge's decision was actually completely color blind,
see Strauss, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 103-05 (cited in note 29).
'1 See Gewirtz, 92 Yale L.J. at 662 (cited in note 26) ("a rule allowing courts to limit
the scope of integration to prevent resistance and flight would give whites incentives for
exaggerated displays of resistance").
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Amendment context, where a speaker is silenced whenever his or
her audience threatens violence. 8 The heckler's veto allows the au-
dience to silence the speaker whenever it disagrees with the
speech. Similarly, integration maintenance programs allow whites
to dictate the contours of desegregation plans. As Judge Sobeloff
has recognized, adoption of integration maintenance quotas "offers
a premium for white resistance. The suggestion that.., qualifying
a desegregation program is a legally acceptable way to discourage
flight [is to be feared]. Once this tactic is sanctioned, it would be
followed by every hostile school board. '59 The impact of a decision
that directly involves only one or two families is likely to be less
far-reaching than that of a desegregation plan, which affects all
families in the school district.
B. The Role of Benign Motivation
Most courts have seen the primary cost of integration mainte-
nance plans as being the denial to some children of the opportu-
nity to attend an integrated school. They have weighed this cost
against the claim that, without such plans, no children would be
able to attend integrated schools. They have then concluded that
because these plans are motivated by benign intent, and because it
is better that some children be able to attend an integrated school
than that none be able to do so, such plans are constitutional."
This analysis undervalues the cost of integration maintenance
plans and mistakenly accepts at face value the assertions of benign
motivation.
In Parent Association of Andrew Jackson High School v.
Ambach ("Andrew Jackson"), for example, the Second Circuit up-
held an integration maintenance plan that implemented a cap of
50 percent on black enrollment.6 1 The percentage of black students
58 Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis M. Seidman, Cass R. Sunstein and Mark V. Tushnet, Con-
stitutional Law 997-1001 (1986).
19 Brunson v. Board of Trustees of School District #1 of Clarendon County, 429 F.2d
820, 827 (1970) (Sobeloff, J., concurring).
60 See, for example, Andrew Jackson, 598 F.2d at 719-20; Johnson, 604 F.2d at 516-17;
Parent Ass'n of P.S. #50 v. Queens, N.Y. Comm. School Dist. #28, 625 F. Supp. 1505, 1509
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (following Andrew Jackson). See also Gewirtz, 92 Yale L.J. at 662 (cited in
note 26) (group harms unlikely if ceilings provide desegregated education to more blacks
than other remedies would); Ackerman, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 245 (cited in note 8) (in housing
context, integration plans should maximize the number of blacks who get integrated
housing).
61 598 F.2d 705. Such caps are often referred to as "tipping factors," and are set at an
estimate of the highest percentage of black students that the white community is willing to
allow in its schools. The theory is that if the percentage of black students rises above the
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in the system was greater than 50 percent; thus, many were unable
to attend desegregated schools.
In approving the plan, the court framed the issue as whether
"an individual non-white student [could] be made to suffer exclu-
sion in a community effort to prevent resegregation of the sys-
tem."62 By framing the question in this manner, the court balanced
the cost of the plan to those children who were compelled to re-
main in a segregated, all-black school against the benefit to those
able to attend desegregated schools.
The court's assumption that the primary cost involved was the
denial to some black children of an integrated education, and that
the dispute was essentially a battle between the competing claims
of non-whites, was shortsighted. Superficially, the issue may be
seen as a conflict among non-whites. To the extent that giving
black children an integrated educational environment is the sole
remedial objective, 63 remedies incorporating a tipping factor can be
seen as an allocation of that benefit among competing blacks. More
importantly, however, the conflict is between the discriminatory
preferences of whites and the right of blacks to non-discriminatory
treatment. 4 Although the inability to attend an integrated school
is a significant cost to individual black families, the more impor-
tant harm associated with integration maintenance plans is in-
flicted on blacks as a group, in the form of stigmatization and in-
stitutionalization of opposition to desegregation.
In addition, the risk of improper process is not eliminated by
the mere assertion of benign motivation. Strict scrutiny is designed
to function as a proxy for case-by-case investigation of actual moti-
vation when the risk that racial prejudice influenced the decision
seems high.65 In Andrew Jackson, the court employed a lower
standard of review because it concluded that the challenged plan
was intended to preserve integration, and that "attentiveness to
population tides [was] the Board's real concern rather than a
tipping factor, whites will begin to leave the system, thus driving the percentage of blacks
higher still, and setting off a chain reaction which will result in a virtually all black system.
See Rossell, 12 J. Legal Stud. 69 (cited in note 2).
" 598 F.2d at 719.
11 See Derrick A. Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470 (1976) (integration ideals may no longer
accord with the educational interests of blacks).
6, See Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 245, 274 (1983): "The
main question in a segregation case never was the right to sit in a particular place in a
courtroom, or a particular place on the beach. The central issue raised by segregation was
one of place-the place of blacks in society."
65 See text at notes 34-35.
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sham." s However, the board may well have condoned the white
opposition to desegregation, or at least identified more with the
concerns of white parents than with those of black parents. The
assertion of benign intent is merely that, an assertion. Precisely
what was in the hearts and minds of the school board members is
unknown, if not unknowable. Moreover, the assertion of benign in-
tent does not alleviate the stigmatic impact of integration mainte-
nance plans. No matter what the ultimate goal of the school board,
these plans have the express purpose of restricting black enroll-
ment to a level more acceptable to whites.
1. Race-Conscious Remedies That Do Not Violate the Equal
Protection Clause. There are two forms of race-conscious remedies
that do not raise process and impact concerns to the same extent
as integration maintenance plans: desegregation plans that do not
incorporate integration maintenance quotas but do involve the as-
signment of students according to race,6" and affirmative action
plans.
Desegregation plans are always race-conscious, even if they do
not incorporate integration maintenance quotas. Yet, such plans
are routinely upheld as constitutional."" These desegregation plans
differ from integration maintenance plans in important ways.
First, there is little risk that desegregation plans that do not
implement integration maintenance provisions are premised on ra-
cial prejudice.6 9 Indeed, such plans are ordinarily implemented in
the face of opposition from whites. Second, desegregation plans are
generally race-neutral in that they place a burden on children of
both races-blacks and whites alike may be bused to achieve de-
segregation. Third, although racially equal or neutral impact does
not in itself exempt race-dependent measures from strict scrutiny,
desegregation plans, unlike institutional miscegenation or "sepa-
rate but equal" schools, do not obviously stigmatize any group. To
the extent that one of the goals of desegregation is to allow chil-
dren of different races to have contact with each other, to destroy
the prior dual system "root and branch," or to make sure that
6 598 F.2d at 718. See also Note, White Flight as a Factor in Desegregation Remedies:
A Judicial Recognition of Reality, 66 U. Va. L. Rev. 961 (permissibility of white flight con-
cerns should turn on "good faith" of school board).
67 These include plans that incorporate such devices as magnet schools and free trans-
fer programs.
11 See, for example, Swan, 402 U.S. at 23-5 (racial quotas based on racial balance in
community were constitutional as a starting point for desegregation); see also Scotland Neck
City Bd. of Education, 407 U.S. at 489-90.
69 Brest, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 16-17 (cited in note 30).
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black children enjoy the superior facilities that the dual system of-
fered some white children, desegregation carries no stigma. On the
contrary, it emphasizes the equality of the races. The absence of
stigmatization, in conjunction with the race-neutral impact (chil-
dren of both races bear the burden of busing and share the benefit
of integrated schools), renders ordinary desegregation plans far less
supect than integration maintenance plans.
As with desegregation plans, the assertion of benign intent in
the case of affirmative action programs is supported by the reality
that such programs are unlikely either to be used to disadvantage
blacks or to implement racial prejudice against whites.70 One of the
arguments advanced against affirmative action is that it stigma-
tizes blacks by suggesting that they are unable to succeed without
special assistance. If affirmative action programs do have such an
effect, that would indeed be an argument for subjecting them to
strict scrutiny. When the stigmatization is remote, however, and
the immediate effect is advantageous, it seems inappropriate to
subject these programs to such review."
Thus, allegedly benign motivation has made a difference only
in those cases where it is clear that the possibility of defective pro-
cess and disadvantageous effect, both stigmatic and material, are
so slight that it is unlikely that the racial classifications were en-
acted out of racial prejudice. Integration maintenance programs,
however, are characterized both by stigmatic impact and the risk
of defective process. Even the Justices who voted in University of
California v. Bakke to uphold a preferential admissions plan af-
firmed the "cardinal principle that racial classifications that stig-
matize-because they are drawn on the presumption that one race
is inferior to another or because they put the weight of government
behind racial hatred and separatism-are invalid without more. '7 2
Integration maintenance plans do violate this principle. This, in
conjunction with the risk of improper process, mandates that they
be deemed unconstitutional, unless they are proven to be the least
restrictive means to achieve a compelling state need.
2. Voluntarily Implemented Integration Maintenance Plans.
One possible variation on the theme of benign intent is that even if
70 See id. at 17; John H. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination,
41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 724 (1974).
71 See Brest, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 19 (cited in note 30); compare William Van AIstyne,
Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court and the Constitution, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775
(1979).
72 438 U.S. 265, 357-8 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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integration maintenance plans implemented in response to court
orders to desegregate ought to be subject to strict scrutiny, volun-
tarily implemented plans ought to escape such review. 7 3 Volunta-
rily implemented plans are, arguably, a clear instance of a school
board acting in good faith. Therefore, the argument goes, strict
scrutiny is not mandated. This argument is flawed in two respects.
First, the risks of process and impact are not alleviated be-
cause the plan is voluntarily implemented. If anything, these risks
are heightened. In Johnson v. Board of Education of City of Chi-
cago, the school board voluntarily implemented a plan designed to
freeze the racial balance at two schools located in neighborhoods
that were undergoing a transition from white to black. 4 The school
board justified the plan on the grounds that it was necessary in
order to prevent the schools from becoming racially segregated.7 5 A
panel of the Seventh Circuit upheld the plan, stating that "in the
limited circumstances of voluntary affirmative action, and in the
absence of an invidious or pernicious intent attributable to the
Board," it was entitled to implement the plan. 6 On these facts, it
seems entirely possible that the board was motivated by an "invid-
ious or pernicious intent." Blacks were moving into the previously
white neighborhoods at a rapid rate. It is just as plausible to say
that the board froze the quotas in order to stem black entry as to
say that it did so in order to stem white flight. That a plan is vol-
untarily implemented does not guarantee a process free of racial
bias.
Second, voluntary implementation of an integration mainte-
nance plan may actually give rise to suspicion of less than good
faith. Imagine a school board meeting where the board members
announce that integration will be limited to a ratio of 30 percent
black, whereupon a white parent leaps to her feet and announces
that she will leave if the ratio reaches 20 percent. Integration
maintenance plans, paradoxically, create an incentive for opposi-
tion. A school board that sincerely wishes to address segregation
cannot afford to cater to, and thereby reinforce, the illegitimate
preferences of its white population.
11 See Note, 66 U. Va. L. Rev. 961 (cited in note 66) (approving of voluntariness and
findings of good faith as criteria in determining constitutionality of integration maintenance
plans).
7 604 F.2d at 508-09.
75 Id. at 510.
76 Id. at 517.
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C. The Unconstitutionality of Integration Maintenance Plans
Integration maintenance plans raise the two most fundamental
concerns of the Equal Protection Clause: concern about the process
through which they are designed and implemented; and concern
about their impact on blacks.
Government actions that implicate the process-oriented con-
cerns underlying the Equal Protection Clause must survive strict
scrutiny: they must be necessary to achieve a compelling state in-
terest.7 To be "necessary," such classifications must be more than
the most effective or least costly way to achieve that interest-they
must be the only way. The unique conflicts created by integration
maintenance plans mandate that the burden of proving them nec-
essary be extremely heavy.
If integration maintenance plans are indeed the only way to
accomplish desegregation, we can choose to utilize such plans, or
we can accept segregation on the grounds that desegregation is not
compelling enough a government interest to justify implementa-
tion of such plans. To say that integration maintenance plans are
unconstitutional because desegregation is not a compelling state
interest is to say that school segregation is constitutionally man-
dated: a school board must allow resegregation rather than insti-
tute an integration maintenance plan. 8
This choice is an extremely painful one, made more difficult
because of the extent to which integration maintenance plans give
rise not only to concerns of process but also to those of stigma. To
allow resegregation is to give up on Brown v. Board of Education.9
But to sanction integration maintenance plans is to sanction the
complete accommodation of white preferences, and to accept the
concomitant harms to a large minority in our society. Integration
maintenance plans should be chosen only if we are absolutely cer-
tain that the only alternative is segregation.
Integration maintenance plans fail this very stringent test of
necessity. First, the empirical evidence on whether such plans are
77 See, for example, In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 721-22; see also text at notes 35-38.
718 The argument can be made that desegregation is less compelling a state interest
when the school board acts voluntarily to remedy a case of de facto segregation than when it
acts to remedy de jure segregation. Where a school district is found to have fostered and
maintained a segregated system, desegregation is a constitutional imperative. Where the
segregation is not the result of state action, the constitutional imperative is lacking. See
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208-09 (1973). Thus, voluntarily implemented
plans are less likely to survive strict judicial scrutiny than are those implemented in re-
sponse to a court order.
7 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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required is far from conclusive. Social scientists disagree on the ex-
tent to which increasing black enrollment does increase white
flight.8 0 Those who have found a correlation between increased
black enrollment and white flight disagree about whether increas-
ing the percentage of blacks causes a one-time drop in white en-
rollment or whether it sets off an irreversible white exodus.81 They
agree, however, that there is insufficient information to support
sweeping policy recommendations.8 2 Given the unacceptable risks
and effects associated with integration maintenance plans, a far
greater degree of certainty as to the need for such plans is war-
ranted before making the choice between integration maintenance
and compelled segregation.
Moreover, even if increasing black enrollment does have a sig-
nificant impact on white flight, the first line of attack ought to be
on addressing that correlation, not on accepting and institutional-
izing it. There are ways to limit white flight that do not involve
limiting black enrollment. First, metropolitan desegregation plans
should be implemented whenever possible.8 3 Such plans desegre-
gate entire metropolitan areas as opposed to single districts within
a metropolitan area. Thus, these plans would include the suburbs
surrounding a city school district as well as the city district itself.
To the extent that school desegregation causes white flight, metro-
politan plans should result in less flight than single district plans.
By increasing the area subject to desegregation, they make it much
more difficult for white families to escape desegregation. 4 In addi-
tion, they increase the pool of students available for reassignment,
10 See, for example, Farley, Symposium on School Desegregation and White Flight at
16 (cited in note 2) (majority of whites apparently do not object to public schools which
have large black enrollments). Compare Rossell, 12 J. Legal Stud. at 88 (cited in note 2)
(increase in white flight corresponds with increase in black enrollment).
81 See Rossell, 42 L. and Contemp. Probs. at 163 (cited in note 4) (most studies show
initial loss of whites in year of implementation is offset in later years, although one study
has found long-term impact). Compare Rossell, 12 J. Legal Stud. at 106 (cited in note 2)
(desegregation continues to have negative long-term impact on white enrollment in many
large central city districts with more than 35 percent black enrollment).
82 Compare Orfield, Symposium on School Desegregation and White Flight at 58 (cited
in note 2) (research can support only limited policy recommendations); School Desegrega-
tion Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 160, 230 (1981) (statement of Christine H.
Rossell) (there is insufficient information to determine whether limiting desegregation would
decrease white flight).
83 But see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (cannot order interdistrict relief
absent an interdistrict violation).




and thus facilitate a greater degree of integration. If a central city
school district is already 90 percent black, a single district plan can
accomplish only token integration. By involving the surrounding
white suburbs, a metropolitan plan can achieve a more substantial
degree of integration.
Second, school boards should work with the community to al-
leviate its fears and concerns about the desegregation process. For
example, white families are often concerned about potentially de-
clining educational quality. By demonstrating a commitment to
educational quality, the board may decrease opposition to desegre-
gation and improve the system as a whole. Finally, desegregation
plans incorporating magnet schools with enriched educational op-
portunities may draw white children. Some of these alternatives
may not work as quickly as integration maintenance plans, but
they are constitutionally sound. Consequently, integration mainte-
nance plans are not absolutely necessary to achieve desegregation.
CONCLUSION
Integration maintenance plans raise serious concerns about
the constitutionality of the process through which they are imple-
mented as well as about their impact on blacks. These concerns
stem primarily from the fact that such plans impose ceilings on
black enrollment that are based on white preferences as to what
that enrollment should be. Although integration maintenance
plans may prevent white flight-and the evidence on that point is
not conclusive-they do so at the risk of allowing racial bias to
enter the process of designing desegregation plans, and at the cost
of further stigmatizing and isolating the very group desegregation
should benefit. These are the evils that the Equal Protection
Clause is designed to prevent; thus, integration maintenance plans
undercut the very goals they purport to advance.
The concerns and conflicts created by integration maintenance
plans are of such magnitude that, absent a showing of absolute ne-
cessity, they cannot be approved. That showing has not been
made. We may, at some point, be forced to choose between accom-
modating private preferences for segregation and accepting
resegregation; but not until integration maintenance plans are
shown to be the only way to achieve the desegregation of our
schools should we allow their use.
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